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DISCRIMINATION IN SITE SELECTION
States With Best
and Worst Voting Records
(Voters as percentage of voting age population)
THE BEST
States 1968
D elaware .......................... .70.0
Idaho ............................. 72.6
Indiana ........................... 71.8
Iow a ............................. 70.8
M innesota ......................... 76.0
New Hampshire ................... 70.0
South Dakota ...................... 72.8
U tah ............................. 76.1
W ashington ....................... 71.0
THE WORST
States 1968
A labam a .......................... 50.3
District of Columbia ................ 33.5
G eorgia ........................... 42.9
M ississippi ........................ 50.6
South Carolina .................... 45.9




































Lots for Sale-Discrimination in Site Selection
Several cases in the area of low and middle income housing site selec-
tion represent the trend of today. They are Gaultraux v. Chicago Hous-
ing Authority,' Hicks v. Weaver,' El Cortez Heights Residents and
Property Owners Association v. Tucson Housing Authority,3 and Shan-
non v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Development.' There
exists a significant trend whereby the courts have (1) scrutinized the
various methods of site selection utilized by housing authorities, and
(2) strongly prohibited racial and economic discrimination in said se-
lection.
1265 F. Supp. 582 (1967), 296 F. Supp. 907 (1969), 304 F. Supp. 736 (1969).
302 F. Supp. 619 (1969).
'457 P. 294 (1969).
'436 F. 2d 809 (1970).
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This trend is reflected by the case law in this area; however, the ad-
ministrative agencies have significant leeway in determining what stan-
dards should be imposed when taking into consideration the racial or eco-
nomic composition of a community prior to actual site selection.
The Gautraux cases5 may be the most significant of the group of cases
because the court has specifically required that affirmative relief be
granted.6 The first case was Gautraux v. Chicago Housing Authority.7
This was an action against the housing authority by black tenants in or
applicants for public housing. It challenged the constitutional validity of
site selection by the Chicago Housing Authority. In that case the dis-
trict court held
* . . that tenants or applicants had right to have site selected for pub-
lic housing projects without regard to racial composition of either sur-
rounding neighborhoods or of projects themselves and had right to
-maintain action to determine whether this opinion that such right
was being denied them was correct and to secure appropriate remedy,
and that issues as to motive or intent of selection of sites for housing
and racial composition of neighborhoods involved were presented
precluding summary judgment for defendants.8
The second Gautraux case was Gautraux v. Chicago Housing Au-
thority.9 This case dealt with issues as to motive or intent of selection of
sites for housing and racial composition of neighborhoods involved."
The second case was an action brought by black tenants in or applicants
for public housing on behalf of themselves and all others similarly sit-
uated alleging that the city housing authority had violated their rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. After the presentation of evidence it
was held that
• . . evidence established that the housing authority intentionally chose
sites for family public housing and adopted tenant assignment pro-
cedures for the purpose of maintaining existing patterns of residential
separation of the races in the city."
'265 F. Supp. 582 (1967), 296 F. Supp. 907 (1969).
'304 F. Supp. 737-743. The judgment order definitively enunciates in the
Gautreaux cases the relief granted. It specificially prescribes what the Chicago
Housing Authority can and cannot do.
'265 F. Supp. 582 (1967).
'Ibid. at 582.
0296 F. Supp. 907 (1969).
10296 F. Supp. 909-915 (1969). Categorically the court elaborated on three
broad areas in its opinion: I. Discriminatory Tenant Assignment Practices, II.
Discriminatory Site Selection Procedures, III. Relief.
11296 F. Supp. 907 (1969).
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The third case was Gautraux v. Chicago Housing Authority. 2 This
case was an enunciation of the relief granted in the second case.'3 The
court held that
... Chicago Housing Authority would not be permitted to cause con-
struction of public housing in part of county, which lay within census
tracts having 30% or more nonwhite population, or within distance of
one mile from outer perimeter of such tracts, unless within three months
following commencement of construction at least 75% of total units
caused to be commenced by authority were outside of that part of
county.
14
The true significance of the third case lies in the fact that the opinion
of the court clearly and unequivocally ordered specific requirements which
must be met by the Chicago Housing Authority." The court defined
specifically the areas where public housing could be built,'6 and how many
units could be started within certain time limitations. 7
The next case Hicks v. Weaver 8 was a class action brought by
Blacks for declaratory and injunctive relief against location of public
housing projects in racially segregated neighborhoods.19 In this case the
sites had been selected, a contractor hired, and one-half of the equipment
and supplies purchased.2" After reviewing the facts that showed diligent
effort on the part of the plaintiff in his attempt to object to the site se-
lection the court held that
...Civil Rights Act forbids construction of federally financed public
housing in all-Negro neighborhoods in absence of clear showing that no
other acceptable sites are available, and that defense of laches was not
available to local housing authority.
2 '
Here the court ordered that the housing authority and Polk Con-
12304 F. Supp. 736 (1969).
'a296 F. Supp. 907 (1969).
14304 F. Supp. 736 (1969).
'6 304 F. Supp. 737-743 (1969). Defendants were ordered to build a certain
percentage of all public housing there after erected in Chicago in the "General
Housing" areas of that city. The "General Housing" area was synonymous roughly
with the predominantly "white" areas.
1 304 F. Supp. 738 (1969).
" Ibid. at 738." 302 F. Supp. 619 (1969).
1 Ibid. at 620.
20 Ibid. at 621-627.21Ibid. at 622. "Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids the construc-
tion of federally-financed public housing in all-Negro neighborhoods in the absence
of a clear showing that no other acceptable sites are available.
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struction Company be enjoined from doing any further work pending
further orders of the court.2" The court also issued a supplemental order
enjoining George M. Romney, his agents, and employees from making
further payment of federal funds to the defendant Housing Authority of
the City of Bogalusa.2"
Another case to be considered in the growing trend toward the
elimination of racial and economic discrimination in site selection is El
Cortez Heights Residence and Property Owners Association v. Tucson
Housing Authority.24 This case can be distinguished from the others
in that it seeks to enjoin the housing authority from placing a low income
housing project in a black middle income neighborhood. After the peti-
tion for a writ of preliminary injunction against construction of a low
cost housing project in petitioners' residential area was denied, the pe-
titioners appealed.25 After reviewing the case the Court of Appeals held
that
. . . where city housing authority, in determining sites for low cost
housing project, failed to consider fact that site chosen was surrounded
by only middle income Negro community in county, housing authority
violated statute prohibiting recipient of federal aid for housing, in de-
termining location or types of housing, from utilizing criteria which
has effect of subjecting persons to discrimination because of race or
substantially impairing accomplishment of objective of housing pro-
gram.
26
Here the court did not hold that the selection per se was illegal, but
that the racial character of the neighborhood could not be ignored in
choosing a low income housing site.27 The court did note that there had
been no low income housing placed in any white middle income neighbor-
hoods.
The last case to be considered here is Shannon v. United States De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development.29 This is one of the most
recent cases dealing with site selection. The suit was brought by residents,
businessmen, and representatives of civic organizations in an urban re-
newal area seeking an injunction against the issuance of a contract of
22 Ibid. at 627, 628.
Is Ibid. at 628.
'457 P. 2d 294 (1969).
25 Ibid. at 294.
26 Ibid., at 294.
27 Ibid. at 297.
28 Ibid. at 296.
"436 F. 2d 809 (1970).
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insurance or guaranty, and against the execution or performance of a
contract for rent supplement payments for an apartment project. When
the complaint was filed the apartment project was about to be con-
structed in an urban renewal area. The district court denied plaintiffs'
application for a preliminary injunction and finally the complaint was dis-
missed."1 Plaintiffs appealed and the primary issue was whether in re-
viewing and approving this type of project (rent supplement housing un-
der 221(d) (3) )32 for site selection Housing and Urban Development
(hereafter referred to as HUD) had any procedures for the consider-
ation of and did in fact consider its effect on racial concentration in the
neighborhood where it was to be built.8" As to this issue the court held
that
.. .the Agency must utilize some institutionalized method whereby,
in considering site selection or type selection, it has before it relevant
racial and socio-economic information necessary for compliance with
its duties under the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts. 4
The court further held that
. . . the agency's judgment must be an informed one; one which
weighs the alternatives and finds that the need for physical rehabilita-
tion or additional minority housing at the site in question clearly out-
weighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating racial concen-
tration.35
The Shannon case is significant in that it prescribes the same racial
discrimination safeguards for 221 (d) (3), supra rent supplement housing
as it does for low income housing. The court, however, leaves the spe-
cific formula to the administrative agency and only advises relevant con-
siderations that should be taken into account.3"
In response to the Shannon case, HUD has formulated some proposed
80 Ibid. at 809.
81 Ibid. at 809.
82 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (1) (a) and 1715 (1) (d) (3) (iii) 436 F. 2d 812 (1970).
This mode of assistance, designed to assist private industry in providing low and mod-
erate income families. 12 U.S.C. § 1715 1 (a), provides that H.U.D. may insure
mortgages on housing owned by eligible sponsors for the entire replacement cost
of the project. 12 U.S.C. § 1715 1 (d) (3) (iii). Sponsors eligible for such one
hundred per cent mortgage insurance include private nonprofit corporations.
8 1bid. at 812.
84 Ibid. at 821.
8I Ibid. at 822.
88 Ibid. at 821, 822. The court lists eleven considerations as relevant for a
proper determination by HUD.
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project selection criteria.37 As was stated earlier the case law in site
selection has followed a definite trend toward the elimination of racial
discrimination. It is also clear that the leeway given administrative agen-
cies such as HUD to develop the guidelines for site selection could under-
mine the ultimate purpose of the law.
For example, in developing their rating system three classifications
are given to determine the appropriateness of a given site-superior,
adequate, and poor. s Only those sites defined as "poor" are eliminated
as unsuitable.3 9 In the area of nondiscriminatory location, a "superior"
rating is given
if the proposed project (1) will be located with respect to which there
is no present likelihood, in the judgment of the area or insuring office
director, that it will become one of minority group concentration, or
(2) will be located in area of minority concentration but is to be located
in a major comprehensive development which will include a range of
housing at various income levels and where experience and judgment
indicate that the area will have a racially inclusive residential pat-
tern.
40
On one hand a superior rating is given because the site is located
in a non-minority site location, but on the other hand, it can be located
in a neighborhood of minority concentration if it appears that urban
renewal is coming. No real guidelines are set down to indicate what "ma-
jor comprehensive development" encompasses in terms of improving a
site with a present minority concentration. If this is not enough confusion,
the proposed regulations go on to define an "adequate" rating to exist
... (1) if the proposed project will be located in an area which is sub-
stantially racially mixed and on the basis of existing demographic
trends it appears that the project will have no signfiicant effect on the
proportion of minority to nonminority families, or (2) if the proposed
project will provide housing in or near an area of minority concentration
in response to an overriding need which cannot otherwise be met. In
the case of an "adequate" rating based on (2), the rating shall be ac-
companied by documented findings based upon relevant racial and socio-
economic information supporting both the overriding need and the
availability of alternate housing.
41
07 36 F.R., 12032138 June 24, 1971 also 24 CFR Port 200.
8 36 F.R., 12034.
36 F.R., 12032.36 F.R., 12034.
36 F.R., 12034.
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Again the agency provides an escape. In the case of an overriding need
which cannot otherwise feasibly be met the plaintiffs granted relief in the
above cases will lose their right to relief.
The trend toward strong case law. against racial and economic dis-
crimination in site selections for low and moderate income housing is
clear. Unfortunately the reality of bureaucratic nonsense leaves doubts
about effective implementation of the law.
HENRI NORRIS
Due Process in Juvenile Proceedings
The juvenile court proceeding has all the procedures of a misde-
meanor or felony court when the records of juveniles are not impounded.
There are many cogent reasons for this position. An "uninformed" ju-
venile either looks upon the peace officer as a friend or a foe, depending
upon the posture the juvenile is in. If he is apprehended in the commission
of an offense, he views the police officer as a foe. Instantly there is belief
of being deprived of freedom. A juvenile not in trouble or not acquainted
with the courts, may believe that the quickest way out is to admit or
affirm every inquiry of the officer.
A juvenile summoned to appear in juvenile center to report to a
probation officer believes that the probation officer is there to help him,
not knowing that the probation officer may bring the complaint against
him. The juvenile again will be prone to affirm or agree to almost any
statement of the probation officer.
In the application of the due process clause, the law should go further
than Gault v. United States.' In this case a fifteen year old boy was the
offender. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed a dismissal of a pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus which sought the release of Gerald
Francis Gault, who had been committed as a juvenile delinquent to the
State Industrial School by the Juvenile Court of Gila County, Arizona.
Here it was stated that Gault was denied various procedural due process
rights. It was held by the Arizona State Supreme Court that, "the
Arizona Juvenile Code impliedly included the requirements of due process
in delinquency proceedings, and that such due process requirements were
not offended by the procedure leading to Gault's commitment."
These five things are essential to the youth in and outside the court:
(1) knowledge of pre-waiver statements, (2) full investigations of the
1387 U.S. 1 (1966).
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